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Extended Abstract 
........................................................._._._._ .....................•.._._--_..._­
This thesis is organized as two chapters whose contents are closely related yet quite 
distinct. The first chapter presents a paper "Role of 'Vision' in Neighborhood Racial 
Segregation: A Variant of the Schelling Segregation Model," authored by myself and Dr. 
Jaggi, which has been accepted for publication by the journal Urban Studies and is 
currently in press (as of April 2003). This chapter introduces the well-known Schelling 
model of neighborhood segregation, outlines the sociopolitical motivation for our work, 
and presents the key results that we believe are of interest to social scientists. Chapter 
two, which ought to be of greater interest to the physics community, presents the results 
of our investigations into the parallels between the Schelling model and critical 
phenomena. 
Our primary extension of the Schelling model was to include social agents who can 
authentically 'see' their neighbors up to a distance R, called 'vision'. By exploring the 
consequences of systematically varying R, we have developed an understanding of how 
vision interacts with racial preferences and minority concentrations and leads to novel, 
complex segregation behavior. We have discovered three regimes: an unstable regime, 
where societies invariably segregate; a stable regime, where integrated societies remain 
stable; and an intermediate regime where a complex behavior is observed. 
Since the primary audience of Urban Studies consists of sociologists and economists, we 
have not elaborated in the first chapter upon the phase transition which was strongly 
suggested by the "complex behavior" in the intermediate regime. The purpose of chapter 
two then, is to elucidate these additional physically interesting aspects of our model. 
Melting is a textbook example of first order (discontinuous) phase transitions. These are 
marked by two central features: a sharp temperature at which the transition occurs, and 
the coexistence of the two phases at that melting point. One can study the first-order 
phase transition that ice undergoes when melting into water by observing the ice while 
continuously raising its temperature. However, if you were only able to view the system 
at certain discrete temperatures, you would only see a either a piece of ice or a puddle of 
water during each observation. Thus in order to study the potential phase transition 
occurring in our model, we must be able to control the governing parameters 
continuously. However, in our original 'discrete' model, R measures how far an agent 
sees from its own horne as an integer number of houses. Since we can only assign 
discrete values to R, it is meaningless to speak of a phase transition occurring as a 
function of this variable. 
To overcome the limitations of our first model, we introduce a continuous model in 
chapter two where the range of vision (denoted R2 for notational clarity) can be varied 
continuously. This model uses a utility function that assigns greater weight to neighbors 
nearer an evaluating agent. The function used to model this decrease in utility 
contribution with distance is an exponentially decaying curve. We control the steepness 
of this curve (and thereby control the agents' vision) using R2. Since R2 can be set to 
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equal any positive real number, we can indeed study the possible phase transition in our 
simulations' behavior as the function of a continuous variable. 
Additionally, the continuous model demonstrates the robustness of the sociologically 
relevant conclusions drawn in chapter one. Our continuous model, a generalization of a 
model developed by Wasserman and Yohe (2001), is in fact more realistic than our first 
model. In particular, we were pleased to discover the same three behavioral regimes and 
all associated trends in both our discrete model and our continuous model. This confirms 
that our original results were robust and not merely algOlithmic artifacts related to the 
specific treatment of vision used in our discrete model. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Role of 'Vision' in Neighborhood Racial Segregation: 
A Variant of the Schelling Segregation Model 




Bloomington, Illinois 61702-2900, U.S.A.
 
{Accepted for publication in Urban Studies (2003), In Press} 
Abstract 
We have extended the Schelling model of neighborhood racial segregation to include 
agents who can authentically 'see' their neighbors up to a distance R, called 'vision'. By 
exploring the consequences of systematically varying R, we have developed an 
understanding of how vision interacts with racial preferences and minority concentrations 
and leads to novel, complex segregation behavior. We have discovered three regimes: an 
unstable regime, where societies invariably segregate; a stable regime, where integrated 
societies remain stable; and an intermediate regime where a complex behavior is 
observed. We present detailed results for the symmetric case (which maximizes conflict), 
where equal numbers of agents of two races occupy the same cityscape. We briefly 
indicate the policy implications of these simulations. 
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I. Introduction: 
Neither the passage of time-thirty five years since the Civil Rights movement, 
nor oflaws --the Fair Housing Act of 1968 or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, 
for example, have eliminated neighborhood racial segregation in these United States. It is 
true (Farley and Frey, 1991); (Farley et aI., 1993); (Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 1997) 
that there has been some decrease in the intensity of racial segregation in small and 
medium cities with relatively small black populations. But, the levels of residential 
segregation of African- Americans in the major metropolitan areas continue to be 
pervasive and persistent (Massey and Denton, 1987); (Massey and Denton, 1993).1 
The scholarly analyses of the explanatory factors possibly influencing this 
sociological condition have been quite exhaustive. Differences in income, housing 
affordability, location of employers and businesses, crime, job opportunities, 
neighborhood racial preferences, racial steering by real-estate professionals, lending 
practices of financial institutions, and a host of other factors have been invoked as likely 
causes (Carr, 1999). The status of the literature on this explanatory enterprise is 
represented, quite fairly in our opinion, by the following quote (Clark, 1991), " In the 
debate about the relative role of these forces, the consensus is that the patterns of 
separation have a multifaceted explanation: Among the explanatory factors, 
neighborhood composition preferences have been singled out as a critical variable both 
by economists, who view preferences from the perspective of consumer behavior theory, 
and by geographers and sociologists, who use preferences and expectations as elements 
of models of residential choice within cities and neighborhoods." This study further 
explores the consequences of individual preferences on neighborhood segregation. 
In two pioneering papers, Schelling (1969; 1971) introduced a model system of 
two distinguishable types of agents with discriminatory individual preferences for certain 
neighborhood compositions, and then quantitatively explored the dynamics of this model 
system.2 In effect, this work was perhaps the first concerted and systematic application 
of what is now called the agent-based modeling approach to sociological systems. The 
towering status of Schelling's legacy in this area is such that, before writing yet another 
paper on the subject, perhaps we ought to pause and ask ourselves, "didn't Schelling 
already say that?,,3 Our goal in this introduction is simply to locate our specific points of 
departure from Schelling's model and from his overall insight. For the limited purpose of 
framing our own work therefore, and because we see our work as an extension of the 
l Massey and Denton coined a term, "hypersegregation" to describe this multi-dimensional, pervasive and 
persistent segregation. 
2 While the original journal article (Schelling 1971) is a tour-de-force in mathematical sociology, the less 
mathematically inclined among us can get the same insights from later essays written for broader audiences 
(Schelling 1971 a, 1978). 
3 This delightfully worded question was ftrst asked (Martin 1999) in a slightly different context of 
contingency and speciftcity of formal models in the area of international security studies, " I think of this as 
the generic "didn't Schelling already say that?" question." 
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Schelling model, we permit ourselves the following brief, though admittedly narrow 
characterization of Schelling's rather deep insights. 
His insight in this subject has frequently been described by scholars by comments 
of the following kind: "Quite minor differences" in individual preferences lead to 
"aggregate results that are strikingly different" (Clark, 1991). Schelling's seminal work 
has since been supplemented by numerous scholars who, for example, conduct" ... a Test 
of the Schelling Segregation Model" and" ... confirm the view that stable integrated 
equilibria are unlikely" (Clark, 1991). Another author (Krugman, 1996) concludes, 
"Guess what: even though individuals are tolerant enough to accept an integrated pattern, 
they end up with more or less total segregation." A very recent paper (Wasserman and 
Yohe, 2001) "examined the robustness of his conclusions in two slightly more realistic 
environments" and found "strong support" for Schelling's conclusions. They write, "The 
second case expanded residents' vision ... The segregation in the equilibrium 
neighborhood was, in fact, even more obvious than before." Other scholars (Epstein and 
Axtell, 1996) have written of Schelling's work, "He found that even quite color-blind 
preferences produced quite segregated neighborhoods". In the present work, we qualify 
these claims and make explicit the contingencies surrounding assertions of this kind. 
This way of framing the implications of the Schelling-model, and the 
corresponding tone of surprise about the apparent disconnect between agent-intent and 
consequences, have also found their way into influential popular writings on the subject. 
A good example of a commentary on the Schelling model is found in a well-researched 
recent essay (Rauch, 2002) in the literary magazine The Atlantic Monthly, where the 
essayist writes, "In the simulation I've just described, each agent seeks only two 
neighbors of its own color. That is, these "people" would all be perfectly happy in an 
integrated neighborhood, half-red, half-blue. If they were real, they might well swear that 
they valued diversity. The realization that their individual preferences lead to a collective 
outcome indistinguishable (italics ours) from thoroughgoing racism might surprise them 
no less than it surprised me and, many years ago, Thomas Schelling." And a particularly 
bad example-- not only because of its failure to understand the nuanced nature of 
Schelling's work but also because of its illogical concatenation of Schelling's 
observations with racist ideology-can be found in an article titled, "Racial Segregation 
is an Inevitability". On the web-site of a British Aryan Unity group, one author 
(Ormerod, 2002) has used-- abused in our view4 -- Schelling's work to pronounce, "But 
this does not undermine Schelling's central insight. Marked segregation can arise from 
only rather mild individual preferences. The main problem faced by British society is 
neither one of racist attitudes nor of residential segregation. Rather, it is the ideology of 
multi-culturalism." In the present work, we provide evidence against such claims of 
inevitability of segregation in Schelling-like models. 
4 We wish to assert that this sense of inevitability of racial segregation, whether of admiring scholars or of 
politically motivated groups, receives no support from Schelling's own writings, which are quite 
circumspect and display an awareness of the contingencies of his celebrated model. 
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There is robust empirical evidence (Farley and Frey, 1991); (Themstrom and 
Themstrom, 1997) that there has been some significant decrease in the intensity of racial 
segregation in small and medium cities in the United States. Is Schelling's model simply 
incompatible with these empirical findings? We were interested in revisiting Schelling's 
model to see if one forgot, as it were, to look in some areas where there might be 
evidence against this notion of inevitability of segregation. 
It is important to acknowledge that there have been other studies that have 
extended agent-based models of racial segregation and racial transition of neighborhoods, 
typically by trying to make the model more complex and realistic. One early, but 
important example of such studies is a policy simulation (Vandell and Harrison, 1978) 
which postulates a third party -- the real estate speculator-- who stands in for the array of 
institutional intermediaries that play, in reality, a major role in the racial transitions in 
neighborhoods. Having acknowledged this class of studies, we point out that the thrust of 
the present work is quite different. It argues for the inclusion of an essential new feature 
of the agents, their vision, in this class of models. Without 'vision', we believe, these 
models will remain fundamentally incomplete. 
II. Scope of This Study: 
The thrust of our work is then to revisit Schelling's model and examine it closely, 
comprehensively and systematically with respect to one particular parameter we believe 
to be quite significant, viz. the range ofvision, R of the agent. We do not claim to be the 
first to have studied the effect of vision in this context. After finishing our simulations 
and during the writing phase, we became aware of two very recent studies, one 
unpublished (Sander et aI., 2000) and the other published (Wasserman and Yohe, 2001), 
which are related to our work. Both these studies recognize the importance of 'seeing' 
other agents who are at some distance from the agent who is making the choice whether 
and where to relocate, and the authors include this effect in different ways in their 
analyses. 
One study (Wasserman and Yohe, 2001) introduces a utility function that 
decreases exponentially with the distance from the agent making the decision, as a way to 
include the effects of racial composition away from the agent. They (Wasserman and 
Yohe, 2001) conduct computer simulations in a portion of the parameter space and 
conclude with a "strong support" for Schelling's claim of segregation. They report, "The 
second case expanded residents' vision ... The segregation in the equilibrium 
neighborhood was, in fact, even more obvious than before.... This result suggests that 
segregation is positively correlated to the vision parameter-an observation that is also 
consistent with Schelling's hypothesis." 
In the other study (Sander et aI., 2000), the neighborhood of approximately 2500 
homes is divided into 25 fixed tracts each containing 100 cells. The utility function of 
the agent depends upon, apart from the Moore neighborhood (see fig 1), upon the racial 
composition in the tract in which the agent is currently located and the tract which 
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contains the trial site where the agent is considering to move. They can vary the relative 
weights of the Moore neighborhood and of the tract. They find that as the weight of the 
extended tract is increased from ato 1, the dissimilarity index increases from about 0.4 to 
0.8. This conclusion is similar to that of Wasserman and Yohe (2001), viz. increasing the 
vision makes segregation worse. In our study, we introduce a different way of including 
vision and study its effects by systematically varying the range of vision. We discover 
that the effect of increased vision is, in fact, more complex and interesting than implied 
by these very recent studies. 
In the standard Schelling model of a two-race 'artificial society' (Epstein and 
Axtell, 1996), agents are characterized by a parameter p, which is a measure of their 
preference for agents of their own kind. Agents evaluate the racial composition of their 
immediate neighborhoods and compare the composition with their own value of racial 
preference, p, to determine whether they will attempt to relocate elsewhere. Our variant 
differs from this in that the agents in fact "see" their neighborhoods up to a certain 
'distance' R from their own home while evaluating their decisions to relocate. 
We find, depending upon the values ofp and R, that the system evolves in one of 
two possible modes. In one region of the parameter space, the system displays the 
familiar (Schelling, 1969; 1971; 1971 a; 1978); (Epstein and Axtell, 1996); (Sander et al., 
2000); (Wasserman and Yohe, 2001) mode where initially integrated communities are 
unstable and quickly resegregate. We call this the unstable regime. But we have 
discovered that there is a large region of the parameter space (P,R), particularly for 
moderate values of R (2'-=:; R '-=:;7), where integrated communities remain stable for 
arbitrarily long times. We call this the stable regime. 
It is important to note that what we have called the stable regime does not 
correspond to some unrealistic, Gandhian levels of racial preferences/tolerances of the 
agents. Once the range of vision R is expanded from myopic levels (say R=1) to rather 
modest levels (say R= 3 to 5), non-segregated stable communities are found to be fully 
consistent with non-zero and quite substantive values ofp. If this insight were to diffuse 
into the collective consciousness of policy makers and of the general populace, it could 
help generate an optimistic outlook for the future of neighborhood integration. 
5 In its standard demographic usage, the term 'neighborhood' evokes a region with ftxed boundaries of a 
specifted size. We use the term 'cityscape' for this and reserve the term 'neighborhood' to denote the 
agent-speciftc and variable subset of homes within a certain distance of the instantaneous location of the 
agent. 
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III. Details of the Extended Schelling Model: 
One of the central issues in agent-based modeling approaches to sociological 
problems is the level of complexity that is appropriate: it needs to be realistic enough to 
lead to acceptable level of congruence with empirical findings without being so complex 
as to provide no insight. It is worth paying heed to what Schelling himself had to say on 
the subject very recently (Holden, 1996), "Thomas Schelling points out that the more 
complex and therefore realistic the model becomes, the more difficult it will be to discern 
cause-effect relationships -- just like real life." Since one is interested in maintaining, if 
possible, a sense of cause-effect relationships, we are cautious in this study and extend 
his model by including just one additional parameter, i.e. range of vision. In particular, 
we intentionally restrict it to agents of only two distinct kinds. It is perhaps better to refer 
to them as 'type one' and 'type two' because the model does not care about the 
underlying reason for the preference p, which is simply a parameter that can be set to any 
value between 0 and 1. There are two reasons why we nevertheless permit ourselves to 
use the racial labels 'white' and 'black' in the rest of this paper. First, in a journal that 
doesn't accept color pictures, the only reasonable way to construct a graphic depiction of 
agents of two types and vacancies is to use black, white and empty sites. Second, it is 
only fair to acknowledge that our primary interest is in bringing the issue of range of 
vision to the discourse on racial segregation. 
This notion of range of vision is best introduced by refening to an aspect of the 
Schelling model that can be a bit confusing at times. For example, Rauch says (2002), "In 
Schelling's model, unhappy agents, like the modeler himself, could survey the whole 
scene to find a better situation." This needs to be made more precise. There are two quite 
distinct kinds of surveying that the agents are capable of. When deciding where to move, 
the agents do survey the whole scene for an available spot, as Rauch states correctly. But 
when it comes to deciding whether to move, the agents scan only their immediate 
neighbors. As if these agents possess a dual vision! The actual situation in the literature is 
slightly more complicated than this. In all previous studies however, the vision for 
determining the 'neighborhood composition' is exceedingly myopic, whereas the vision 
for locating satisfactory sites is unrestricted. 
We define the R-neighborhood of an agent as the set of all sites that can be 
reached by traveling R spaces in any combination of the cardinal directions. In our 
model, the agent does, in fact, evaluate the racial composition in this extended 
R-neighborhood to determine the satisfaction ofhislher racial preferences in deciding 
whether to look for a site to move to. 
Note that the R-neighborhood is not a fixed-boundary neighborhood or a tract of 
the sort Sander et al. (2000) employed. We let each agent define its own neighborhood, 
centered about itself. We feel this is a more realistic definition, especially for agents that 
would otherwise be near the boundary of a tract. 
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In the spirit of avoiding unnecessary complication, we restrict, at least in the 
present study, all agents in a given ensemble to have the same range of vision R. We 
treat R as a non-dynamic, variable parameter and systematically explore the effect of 
varying R from one simulation to another. Our goal is to develop a qualitative sense of 
what the consequences are of varying the vision R. In future studies, one might wish to 
consider inhomogeneous models characterized by a range of distributions for R even 
within the same ensemble of agents. 
• • • • • e • • • • • •• • • 




• • • • •••• . . 
· · · · e·· · · .........
• • • • • • • • • • . .• •••• .....• • • ... 
• 
Moore R = 4 R = 5 
Fig. 1 
Neighborhoods specified by Vision 
The large dots in these figures represent the agent evaluating its 
neighborhood, and the smaller dots represent those agents it considers part of 
its R-neighborhood. The Moore neighborhood is also shown for comparison. 
Roughly speaking, the Moore neighborhood is equivalent to what we might 
call "R = 1.5" 
Our computer simulation essentially does four things: it creates a randomly 
generated artificial society, it repeatedly evaluates the satisfaction of individual agents 
and if necessary moves them, it creates a graphic display of the society for the user, and it 
measures the segregation of the neighborhoods. 
When the goal is to attempt a direct contact between simulations and demographic 
data for specific cityscapes, one must obviously use the known geography and the known 
boundary conditions. But our central goal in this work is to extract and to present an 
understanding of how varying R affects the nature of segregation, while minimizing 
computational artifacts. Small size effects and edge effects are the two important 
artifacts that all modelers must deal with, making a compromise between the desire to use 
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a large society (which reduces ensemble-to-ensemble fluctuations) and the limits to 
computational power at one's disposal. Due to the computer memory limitations of his 
day, Schelling's pioneering work employed 13x16 or 8x8 arrays. However, in 
contemporary research such as that of Epstein and Axtell (1996) and our own, the chosen 
geography of societies consists of square NxN arrays, where N=50. Additionally, we use 
periodic boundary conditions in both dimensions, i.e. the 'east' and 'west' borders of the 
society 'wrap around' to meet one another, and the 'north' and 'south' borders do the 
same. So, technically the society is on an edgeless torus (i.e. donut), not on a flat grid. 
This has the additional advantage, in the present context, of suppressing boundary effects, 
so that any observed variation in segregation pattern can be reliably attributed to variation 
inR. 
The parameter c represents the concentration of the minority race. Since the 
central goal of this study is to understand the effect of the range of vision R, we have 
intentionally kept the model symmetric between the two races. Thus equilibrium 
configurations for c and (l-c) are identical except that labels for 'black' and 'white' are 
switched. Therefore c is restricted in the range (0 < c ~ 0.5). An agent's preference pis 
simply the minimum fraction of agents of its own race it must see in its R-neighborhood 
to be satisfied, i.e. to have no desire to move. The parameter v (0 ~ v < 1) represents the 
concentration of vacant homes.6 
The code randomly picks (I-v) N 2 sites in the array to be initially occupied by 
c(1-v) N 2 'blacks' and (l-c)(1-v) N 2 'whites'. During each iteration of this portion of the 
program, an agent is selected at random for 'evaluation'. The agent looks around in its R­
neighborhood. If the computed ratio of agents of the same race to total agents in its R­
neighborhood is greater than or equal to its preference p, the agent is satisfied: it does 
nothing and this iteration is finished. However, if this ratio is lower than p, the agent 
makes a series of attempts to move. 
In attempting to move, the agent randomly selects a vacant site, anywhere in the 
society, and performs the same kind of evaluation it performed at the site of its current 
home. If there would be a greater fraction of like neighbors in the R-neighborhood of this 
'trial' vacant site, thus potentially increasing its satisfaction, the agent moves, leaving its 
old home vacant. If the move would not increase the satisfaction of the agent, it 
randomly selects a different vacant site to evaluate if it can increase its satisfaction by 
moving. This process is repeated up to vN 2 times, corresponding to each vacant site 
being evaluated an average of once, before admitting defeat, for the time being, and 
staying put. 
For instance, with a 50x50 society with 90% occupancy, an agent would view at 
most 250 new homes before either finding a suitable new location or admitting defeat 
until selected again. It turns out that, in actual simulations, very few agents are forced to 
6 It turns out that R, p, and c are the interesting, essential and dominant independent variables in this model, 
whereas v affects the segregation peripherally. For this reason, all results reported in this paper correspond 
to a typical value of v=O.l. 
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admit defeat unless the society is characterized by very high values ofp, the preference 
for one's own kind. 
The 'evaluation' portion of the program is repeated until no more agents wish to 
move: equilibrium has been reached. Typically, this occurs when everyone is satisfied, 
but equilibrium societies also occur where agents are dissatisfied but no 'better' locations 
exist to move to. Again, the latter occurs primarily in high-preference societies. 
One might wonder why, in our model, an agent moves to the first site it finds with 
a higher fraction of like neighbors. Wouldn't an agent want to move to a site with the 
highest available fraction? We note that because we have chosen not to include a 
'moving cost', this question turns out to be moot. Since agents have no cost of 
movement, they are able to move freely as many times as they wish. Furthermore, every 
move increases the fraction of like neighbors for both the agent moving and (for societies 
with p D 0.5) for all agents in the mover's old and new R-neighborhoods. So, only 
'utility improving' behavior occurs, and in all equilibrium societies that we present in this 
paper, all agents are maximally satisfied. 
Two additional items of detail are worth pointing out. First, the total number of 
agents remains the same: the model, by design, does not allow mobility of agents 
completely off the cityscape (that is a different model altogether). Also, simple two-way 
trades of homes are not incorporated into the model, because they are, apart from being 
unrealistic, believed to be irrelevant in determining the final equilibrium configurations. 
We construct a metric, S, called the "ensemble averaged, von Neumann 
segregation coefficient at equilibrium" as follows. Each agent looks at its von Neumann 
neighborhood, calculates the actual fraction of neighbors of like race to the total number . 
of neighbors (this denominator isn't always four since some agents have vacancies in 
their neighborhood). Then, this fraction is 'scaled' in such a fashion that it yields a 
contribution between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to what one would find in a random 
initial society of the given concentration e, and 1 represents a total segregation. These 
scaled values are then averaged over all agents to determine S. This metric is closely 
related to the dissimilarity index used in the demographic literature, and approaches the 
same value (0 and 1) in the limits of complete integration and total apartheid respectively. 
Formally, S is defined by the following equation, 
where/wee) and/b(e) represent the expected fraction of white or black neighbors 
respectively in a completely random initial society with concentration e ofminorities. 
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Note that S can, in principle, take on negative values! Imagine a 'checkerboard' 
society with no vacancies and c=0.5, in which the sites were filled with a perfectly 
alternating pattern of the two races. In this case, the numerical value of S would actually 
be -1. In this paper, however, an unbiased random number generator with appropriate 
probabilities generates the initial configuration of a society. At the beginning of the 
simulation, the configuration is always integrated: typical values of S in this starting 
configuration are 0.00 ± 0.02. Since the agents only move to locations with greater 
fractions of their own kind-- In this rather conservative model, an agent never moves to a 
site whose R-neighborhood is more diverse than its current site-- S either remains close to 
zero or increases with time. 
IV. Results: 
IV (a). The Effect of Varying R for the Case of Moderate Preferences: 
All results presented in sections III and IV are for the case c=0.5, corresponding 
to equal numbers of two races trying to occupy the same cityscape. Initially, we explore 
the case p= 0.5, because it is the prototypical case and has been the focus of much earlier 
work. For R=l (see Fig. 2), even though the initial society (left panel) was random and 
fully integrated, the final, equilibrium society (right panel) is substantially segregated, in 
agreement with earlier work (Schelling, 1971); (Axtell and Epstein, 1996); (Wasserman 
and Yohe, 2001); and (Sander et aI., 2000). But we point out that the segregation 
coefficient S is about 0.62, much less than the value of S=l, which characterizes total 
segregation. It is therefore inappropriate to describe this as 'almost complete' 
segregation. We also wish to emphasize the dendritic nature of the pattern, which is 
distinct from the two-domain segregation that we present next. 
Now, we exhibit results that demonstrate the consequences of expanding the 
vision of the agents. For the same preference, i.e. p=0.5, but with the agents enabled to 
'see' sites up to five spaces away from them, i.e. R=5, the structure of the equilibrium 
society is strikingly different from the von Neumann case, as evidenced by Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 2 
Initial (left) and Equilibrium (right) Societies for R = 1, P = 0.5 
'Small-domain' segregation occurs. This is characterized by small, partially 
interconnected (dendritic) ghettos. 
Fig. 3 
Initial (left) and equilibrium (right) societies for R = 5, P = 0.5 
Since agents require half of their neighbors in a larger R-neighborhood (containing 60 
sites) to be of their own race, 'large-domain' segregation occurs. In fact, a 'complete' 
segregation occurs, leading to only two domains (i.e. ghettos) at equilibrium. 
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Now, the segregation is much "worse" than in the von Neumann case in two 
aspects. First, the pattern is better described as two isolated domains (or ghettos, if one 
wants to use the term), quite unlike the dendritic, small-domain segregation for the 
prototypical case ofp=0.5, R= 1, presented in Fig. 2. Second, the computed segregation 
coefficient S for the equilibrium neighborhood in Fig. 3 is approx. 0.97, reflecting the 
obviously far greater degree of segregation as compared to Fig. 2,which was 
characterized by S=0.62. Perhaps one should reserve the tenns 'complete' or 'total' 
segregation for such two-domain segregation with S close to 1.0. 
Wassennan and Yohe (2001) first noticed that when they expanded their 
resident's vision (effectively at p = 0.5), "even more obvious" segregation occurred. This 
is similar to the findings of Sander et al. (2000) that as the relative weight of the extended 
tract (as compared to the Moore neighborhood) is increased from 0 to 1, the dissimilarity 
index increases from about 0.4 to 0.8. Even though these two studies, (Wassennan and 
Yohe, 2001) and (Sander et a!., 2000), had introduced the effect of distant agents in quite 
different ways, this result of ours, i.e. increased segregation with increasing vision, is in 
qualitative agreement with their results. 
Wassennan and Yohe's utility function incorporates an agent's desire to be near 
its own kind and the agent's desire to be far from the other kind, according to the 
fonnula: 
n n 
U j = I r(d(i)-l) + A I r(d(k)-l) 
;=0 k=O 
where d(i)2:1 is the distance ofa neighbor ofindividualj's own race, d(k)2:1 is 
the distance of a neighbor of a different race, n is the number of neighbors within a range 
of vision, and A is a measure of the agent's attitude towards members of the other race. 
Negative values of)c correspond to an agent wanting to be far from agents of the other 
race, but positive values ofA indicate that an agent wants to be near agents of the other 
race (possibly even more so than agents of its own race if A>l). Wassennan and Yohe 
always use A= -1, so that equal weight is attached to an agent's desire to be near its own 
kind and its desire to avoid the other kind. An agent will try to move if its utility falls 
below a certain value, and Wassennan and Yohe present results for simulations in which 
the threshold is zero. Note that this is qualitatively similar to our moving criteria, except 
that in our model the effects on utility do not decay with distance from the agent. Thus, 
Wassennan and Yohe's value of A= -1 corresponds to p=0.5 in the language of our 
simulations: an agent will move if the (weighted or unweighted) fraction of like 
neighbors equivalently falls below 50%. Incidentally, Wassennan and Yohe also studied 
the effect of public goods in their work. But our work does not include any such external 
factors. 
At first, this consequence of increased vision can appear a bit surprising. But 
think about a stage where a cityscape has just begun to segregate. Now if R= 1, agents 
directly adjacent to a ghetto may wish to move. But, ifR were 5, agents several sites 
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away from the ghetto boundary are also likely to be unsatisfied. Thus, for larger R, a 
greater number of moves will occur in each simulation, and each move increases 
segregation. It is this 'amplifying' effect of R during the early stages of segregation 
dynamics that explains the 'worsening' for the case p=0.5. 
IV (b). The Effect of Varying R in the Stable Regime: 
We now explore the consequences of varying R for the case where the agents' 
preferences for their own kind are a bit smaller, but still nonzero. i.e. when societies are a 
bit more enlightened. In this study, we are not interested in utopian societies, i.e. one in 
which agents actively seek more diverse neighborhoods than their current site. In fact, 
this is explicitly forbidden in the present model. In this model, agents move only into less 
diverse neighborhoods, to find more neighbors of their own kind, to satisfy their racial 
preferences. Nor are we interested in unrealistic agents with a Gandhian, color-blind 
world-view, where one does not care at all about the typology of one's neighbors: this 
corresponds to p=O. It is worth emphasizing, if only because many observers and 
commentators have mischaracterized p=0.5 as "quite color-blind", e.g. (Epstein and 
Axtell 1996), that the prototypical case ofp=0.5 is far from representing color-blind 
agents: it, in fact, corresponds to an agent who never wants to be in the slightest minority 
under any circumstance. This agent demands that 50% of its neighbors must be of its own 
kind, at all times. If not, this agent tries to move, aggressively and repeatedly, until it 
finds a suitable site or until it has checked out all possibilities. 
We could pick a point half way between being a color-blind Gandhian (p=0) and 
one who moves continually to avoid ever being in the slightest minority under any 
circumstance (p=0.5): this halfway point would correspond to p=0.25. In order to be 
more realistic, we first present the results for the case, p=0.3. Fig. 4 shows our results fOf 
p=0.3 andp=0.5 for R=I, 3, and 5. Recall that in this paper, an unbiased random number 
generator with appropriate probabilities always generates the initial configuration of a 
society, which is always integrated. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we do not display 
the initial state of the society. All the panels in Fig. 4 (and in later figures) correspond to 
the final, equilibrium configurations of the society. 
Page 17 of 40 







Equilibrium societies for different values of Rand p 
The left column corresponds to the stable regime (p=0.3) and the right column 
corresponds to the unstable regime (p=0.5). 
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For R=l, the equilibrium societies for both cases (p=0.3 and 0.5) appear to have 
what we have called "small domain" or "dendritic" segregation. In fact, they are barely 
distinguishable from each other. And for the p=0.5 case, as demonstrated by the panels 
on the right half of Fig. 4, the "worsening" effect of increased vision is again quite 
obvious. 
But for the p=0.3 case, displayed by the panels on the left half of Fig. 4, it is 
obvious that as R is increased, the tendency of the society towards segregation is reduced 
dramatically, and monotonously. Indeed, the equilibrium society for p=0.3, R=5 case is 
almost completely integrated: for this case, the computed value ofSis 0.03± 0.03! Even 
for R=3, a very modest increase in one's vision, the value of S for the equilibrium society 
is already down to 0.16± 0.04! This result, in and of itself, is important. 
Recall that we have chosen to concentrate on the worst-case scenario of c=0.5 
(equal numbers of two races trying to live in the same cityscape). And, even in this worst 
case scenario, stable, integrated communities are formed with a rather modest increase in 
vision (R=3 to 5) and for significant non-zero values ofp (0.3 in this case). We conclude 
that in order to have stable, integrated societies, it is not necessary for the agents to have 
utopian attitudes (actively seeking more diverse neighborhoods): this is not allowed in the 
present model. Nor is it necessary for the agents to have a Gandhian, color-blind world­
view, where one does not care at all about the typology of one's neighbors: this would 
correspond to p=O. All one needs is a rather modest decrease in one's obsession with 
insisting that one must never be a minority in one's own neighborhood at any length scale 
(which is what p=0.5 means)! A decrease fromp=0.5 to p=0.3 when combined with the 
powerful amplifying effect of even a modest increase in vision; from a myopic R=l to a 
modest R=3 or 4, leads to stable, integrated societies! 
The fact that stable, integrated neighborhoods form for such modest and 
eminently reasonable values of the parameters can have significant impact on the 
perspectives ofpolicy makers. It provides some reason for the hope that reduction in 
racial neighborhood segregation-even complete integration-is a politically and socially 
viable goal. This result is also reassuring from another point of view. Recall that there is 
robust empirical demographic evidence (Farley and Frey 1991); (Farley et al. 1993) that 
there has been some significant decrease in the intensity of racial segregation in small and 
medium cities in the United States. Conservative commentators (Thernstrom and 
Thernstrom, 1997) have labored to make this point, but usually in the context of 
challenging what they believe to be exaggerated claims of liberal scholars or activists 
regarding the extent of racial neighborhood segregation. Our work suggests that we 
should not abandon Schelling type models: when extended to include agent-vision, they 
have the potential of giving us useful insights and of being consistent with empirical 
findings. Our work strongly supports the belief (Carr, 1999) that "Initiatives aimed at 
changing perceptions that fuel the desire to segregate will have a broader impact on 
reducing or eliminating segregation". Our simulations also lends some theoretical 
support to two specific policy initiatives (Yinger, 1995): to improve the availability and 
the flow of housing market information (increase R) and to encourage home-seekers to 
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consider alternate neighborhoods where their own race is not concentrated (increase R, 
effectively encourage a decrease inp). 
We have discovered that the phase diagram of this model is much richer than 
previously believed: there are two distinct regimes of behavior in this model. In one 
regime, typified by p=0.5, initially integrated cityscapes segregate, the value of S 
increases with time, and it approaches a large value at equilibrium. This equilibrium 
segregation, S(R), increases if R is increased: we call this the unstable regime. In the 
other regime, exemplified by p=0.3, initially integrated cityscapes segregate very little 
and S approaches a small value at equilibrium. This equilibrium segregation, S(R), 
decreases if R is increased: we call this the stable regime. Fig. 5 graphically summarizes 
our results for S(R), l::;RSl for the cases p=0.3 and p=0.5: the bifurcation and the two 
regimes are quite self-evident in this phase-diagram. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
a new teclmical result, whose importance lies in suggesting a new way of talking about 
the relation between agent-intent, agent-vision and the degree and nature of segregation 
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Segregation vs. R in the Unstable and Stable Regimes 
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The behavior of the simulations in the stable regime is actually a bit more 
straightforward than the behavior in the unstable regime. For a moment, think about the 
case at hand, i.e. c=0.5, p=0.3. In an initial random society cOlTesponding to these 
parameters, an agent has approximately 75% chance of having at least 30% of its von 
Neumann neighbors being of the same race. So, if R=l, about a quarter of the agents are 
dissatisfied, and move to 'better' locations. Since movement in this model always leaves 
behind some pockets of above-average concentration of minority agents, the chain­
reaction does indeed lead to a modest amount of segregation for the R=l case. But when 
the agents' vision is allowed to expand to 5, each agent has a very high probability 
(>99%) of seeing at least 30% of their own race. So, in the R = 5 simulations, very few 
agents are initially unsatisfied, and their moves cause very few, if any, of their far-sighted 
and fairly tolerant neighbors to become dissatisfied. 
Thus, in the case where the agents don't insist upon quite as many of their 
neighbors being of the same race as the proportion occurring in the entire society, with 
high enough vision, segregation ceases to occur! In the extreme case, if the agents were 
to 'see' the entire society, movement would never occur, regardless oftheir preference for 
like neighbors because they would realize that their 'lot' could not be improved. 
Although most people, in reality, are likely to be more concerned with those in a fairly 
small neighborhood around them, even at R = 5, withp=0.3, we see virtually no 
segregation, and the society is already quite integrated at a modest value of R=3. 
IV (c). Threshold (Critical) Value of Preference, Pc Separating the Two Regimes 
The R= 1 case of this model has a certain peculiar feature which, if viewed in 
isolation, can lead one to develop a false sense of a disconnection between agent-intent 
and the final equilibrium states of the cityscape: a case of 'the invisible hand' notions 
taken needlessly too far. As we indicated in the introduction, one example of such a sense 
of disconnect in the literature is provided by the claim, " ... even quite color-blind 
preferences produced quite segregated neighborhoods" (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). In 
this section, we first indicate what this peculiar feature is and then go on to demonstrate 
that this peculiarity is erased for higher values of R, the range of vision. When the entire 
scene in the parameter-space is surveyed, there is no need to invoke any mysterious, 
invisible-hand, which somehow and unavoidably leads to segregation. A coherent and 
direct relationship between agent-intent and the degree and kind of segregation is 
restored. 
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The five panels in Fig. 6 display the equilibrium societies for a range of values of 
p from 0.3 to 0.5 in increments of 0.05 for the case R=1. If one had access to results only 
for this case ofmyopic vision (R= 1), and only for this range ofp, one could perhaps not 
be faulted too much for concluding that this model seems to lead, almost always, to a 
certain amount of segregation. And that segregation S(P) seems to be very weakly 
dependent upon p, in this range ofvalues ofp, suggesting a disconnect of sorts between 
agent-intent (P) and outcome (S). But, this is not particularly mysterious. To understand 
this, think of the initial, random configuration for the case at hand, i.e. N=50, c=0.5, 
v=0.1 and calculate the number of agents having different numbers n of occupied 
neighbors (without regard to their color). It is easy to calculate that the approximate 
number of agents with 4,3,2 and 1 occupied neighbors is 1476, 657, 110 and 8 
respectively. For the 1476 agents with n=4 occupied neighbors, their decisions are 
identical for all values ofp in the range 0.3:S p :s 0.5: in each case, they require 2 
neighbors of their own race to be satisfied. The same is true for the 118 agents with n=1 
or 2 occupied neighbors: 1 neighbor of their own kind is needed to satisfy them. The only 
decision that varies in this range ofp is the decision of 657 agents with n= 3 occupied 
neighbors who need 1 neighbor for p:S 1/3 and 2 neighbors for 1/3 :Sp < 0.5. So, one 
expects no difference among the cases p=0.35, 0.4, 0.45 and 0.5 and only a modest 
decrease in segregation for the p=0.3 case. When viewed in this light, the lack of 
variability in Fig. 6 is a trivial consequence of excessive granularity for the R=1 case. 
Without the amplifying effect of increasing R, the bifurcation, that must happen 
somewhere between p=0.3 and p=0.5, (as is evident from Figs. 4 and 5) would not have 
been apparent at all to researchers who explored only von Neumann or only Moore 
neighborhoods. We use the symbol Pc to denote the threshold/critical value ofp for 
which the initial slope of the S(R) graph changes, from a negative value to a positive 
value). This threshold/critical preference, pc demarcates societies that will tend to 
segregate from those where integrated neighborhoods will be stable. The specific value of 
this threshold pc is likely to be of interest to theorists who might explore related models, 
to empirical demographers, and to sociologists who conduct surveys to determine agent 
preferences in contemporary communities. 
Towards this end, it is useful to plot out S(P,R) over a broader range ofp, in small 
increments ofp. There are two ways to display this three-dimensional data set. We 
present this data in Fig. 7 as a family of graphs S(R) for various values ofp. (For all 
values ofp~ 0.5, S(R) increases monotonically. This range is therefore not displayed in 
the figure.) It is clear that the initial slope of the S(R) graph changes from a positive value 
to a negative value at pc ~ 0.35. For clarity, we also superimpose, in Fig. 8, graphs 
representing S(P) for two values ofR, i.e. R=1 and R=5. This figure demonstrates how 
increased vision strongly amplifies the dependence ofS upon p. The very weak 
dependence for R=1 is transformed into a steep variation for R=5: S increases very 
rapidly between 0.32 < P < 0.36 for R=5. Thus, for moderate and realistic values ofR, a 
coherent and monotonic relationship between agent-intent (P) and outcome (S) is 
restored. The value ofp for which S=0.5 may be taken as the dividing line, within this 
model, between segregated and integrated societies. This gives pc ~ 0.345. Thus, even 
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for the worst-case scenario of c=0.5 (the conflict of interest is maximized when equal 
numbers of two races try to live in the same cityscape), and for realistic values ofR, 
approximately 35% of the parameter-space (P, R) leads to stable, integrated communities. 
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Increasing R has the effect of amplifying the agent's preferences. 
For the sake of completeness, we mention that there is a narrow, intermediate 
region of the parameter space (p=OA, 8~:S12) where the system displays complex, 
metastable behavior, strongly resembling first order phase transitions in physical systems. 
We refrain from providing details because they are unlikely to have sociological 
significance. 
VI. Conclusions 
We have introduced and studied an extended Schelling model of racial 
neighborhood segregation, in which the agents authentically 'see' their neighbors up to a 
distance R; we call it the 'vision'. We have systematically and quantitatively explored the 
consequences of varying R and have developed a qualitative sense of how vision interacts 
with racial preferences p and minority concentrations c to lead to a non-simple 
segregation behavior. 
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We have discovered that the parameter space of this model has three regimes of 
behavior: the unstable regime, where the societies invariably segregate and segregation 
increases as vision, R, increases; the stable regime, where integrated societies are stable 
and segregation decreases as vision, R, increases; and a narrow intermediate regime 
where a complex behavior is observed. 
The central policy implication of our study is an optimistic note: contrary to popular 
belief, rather modest decreases in xenophobia and/or preferences for one's own kind, 
when coupled with increased vision, can lead to stable and integrated neighborhoods. 
Public policy or procedures can effectively increase vision, e.g. realtors and clients could 
be provided with demographic data for c(R) around various locations and/or tax 
incentives could be offered to avoid regions where fluctuations in c(R) are above the 
global average. The education community and other social agents who work to lower 
preference for one's own kind and to increase tolerance for the 'other', can take strong 
encouragement from this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 





Our original intent in proposing a variant of the Schelling segregation model was 
to use knowledge from computational physics to inform upon sociological collective 
behavior. Specifically, the decision to incorporate vision was motivated by an analogy 
with Ising models. The phase diagram of Ising models with random exchange 
interactions, Jij, (models which have some similarity to Schelling models with initially 
random racial configurations) is known to depend upon the range of the interactions. It 
seemed reasonable, therefore, for us to expect our variant of the Schelling model to 
exhibit different dynamics when different ranges of vision were employed. 
Much to our delight, this interdisciplinary venture has proved to be doubly 
enlightening, as our work in sociology has delivered us a potentially important physical 
result. For simulations in our intermediate regime, we have observed dramatically large 
run-to-run fluctuations in equilibrium values of S. These run-to-run fluctuations are 
characterized by metastability and an extremely bimodal distribution of S, consisting of 
two very narrow peaks near S;::::;O (almost completely integrated) and S;::::;0.9 (almost 
completely segregated) respectively: the open symbols in Fig. 2-1 show these peak 
values. The similarity to a first order transition from a 'supercooled' liquid-like to a 
'superheated' solid-like phase is striking. 
In order to study the possibility of a phase transition, in the traditional sense of the 
term, occurring in our model, we need to be able to control the governing parameters 
continuously. This is so because traditionally a phase transition is described by the 
discontinuity of a thermodynamic state function, or of one of its derivatives, as a field 
parameter is varied continuously. Typical examples include melting as a function of 
temperature and superconductivity as a function of temperature or magnetic field 
intensity. However, in our original model, R measures how far an agent sees from its own 
home as an integer number of houses. Since we can only assign discrete values to R, it is 
difficult to speak of a 'phase transition' as usually understood. We thus were motivated to 
propose a new model. 
-----­ --­ - --­ -
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S vs. R in the Intermediate Regime (p = 0.4)
 
II. Our Continuous Model 
We have designed a continuous model where the range of vision (denoted R2 for 
notational clarity) can be varied continuously. In this model, racial preferences are 
modeled by a utility function which is maximized during simulation. Each pair of agents 
contribute a certain utility which depends upon the racial identities of the agents and upon 
their geographic distance, rij, from each other. 
Our continuous model is a generalization of the model found in a study by 
Wasserman and Yohe (2001), which introduces a utility function that decreases 
exponentially with distance as a way to include the effects of the racial composition of 
neighbors further away from the agent's immediate neighborhood. Wasserman and 
Yohe's utility function incorporates an agent's desire to be near its own kind and the 
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where d(i)2:1 is the distance ofa neighbor ofindividualj's own race, d(k)2:1 is 
the distance of a neighbor of a different race, and n is the number of neighbors within a 
range of vision. Notice that in Wasserman and Yohe's model, equal weight is attached to 
an agent's desire to be near its own kind and its desire to avoid the other kind. An agent 
will try to move ifits utility falls below a certain value, and Wasserman and Yohe present 
results for simulations in which the threshold is zero. This is qualitatively similar to the 
moving criteria for our discrete model (for the case p=0.5, i.e. an agent will move if the 
(weighted or unweighted) fraction of like neighbors equivalently falls below 50%), 
except that in our discrete model the effects on utility do not decay with distance from the 
agent. 
Our continuous model is an extension of our discrete model, but it also 
generalizes Wasserman and Yohe's model. The utility function which controls our 
continuous model is, 
, r rkJUj = ~ [ L e- ~2 - J1 t e- R2 R2 i=\ k=I 
where ri and rk represent the distances7 of the {h and k1h agents, respectively, from the 
agent performing evaluation, I and u represent the number of like and unlike neighbors, 
respectively, fl is a parameter which indicates agent attitude, and R2 represents a range of 
vision appropriate for our continuous model. While our utility function retains certain 
features of Wasserman and Yohe's model, such as exponentially-decaying utility and 
disutility contributions from like and unlike neighbors, we have added the two important 
parameters, fl and R2, which bear qualitative similarity to p and R from our first model. 
Positive values of,u cOITespond to an agent wanting to be far from agents of the other 
race, but negative values of fl indicate that an agent wants to be near agents of the other 
race (possibly even more so than agents of its own race if fl < -1). Note that Wasserman 
and Yohe' s model is a special case of our continuous model - in the language of our 
continuous simulations, Wasserman and Yohe only use fl =1. The range of vision, R2, 
controls how rapidly the magnitude of the utility contributions decay with distance from 
the evaluator. The factor of R/ preceding the summations is merely a scaling factor to 
allow equal comparison of simulations with different R2 values when a nonzero moving 
threshold is used. 
7 In this continuous model, the distance between agents is literally the closest distance from one site to the 
other, taking into consideration our periodic boundary conditions. In other words, r = ~x 2 + y2 ,where 
x is the fewest number of columns between agents counting either east or west and y is the fewest number 
of rows between agents counting either north or south. 
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Notice that in our discrete model, all occupied sites within an evaluating agent's 
range of vision contribute the same amount of utility (or disutility). Thus, for the discrete 
case R = 7, an agent's desires are equally impacted by those one home away and by those 
seven homes away. While this "square" utility function (see Fig. 2-2) may seem 
unrealistic, it was employed in our original work for the sake of simplicity. While the 
exponentially-decaying utility function (see Fig. 2-2) seems intuitively more realistic, we 
introduced it primarily because the continuity of R2 allows us to study our model's 
possible critical behavior. 
Page 33 of 40 
Discrete Model, R = 5 Continuous Model, R2 = 1.5 
Utility Contribution Utility Contribution 
4 54 5 
Distance 
4 2 Distance 
Fig. 2-2 
Utility Contribution vs. Distance 
The utility contributions of neighboring agents in our continuous model 
"decay" with distance from the evaluating agents; those in our discrete 
model do not. 
Note: Agents can be non-integer distances away from the evaluator. For 
example, agents can be a distance of J2 or J5 from one another. The 
vertical lines seen in the figure, located at only integer distances, are meant 
to be only a guide to the eye. 
III. Nattire of the Phase Transition 
In order to investigate the possibility of a phase transition in our model, we must ' 
determine whether several fundamental criteria are met. First, we must observe two 
distinct phases - one characterized by an order parameter near one and the other 
characterized by an order parameter near zero. By using our segregation metric, S, as an 
order parameter and by viewing the type of results displayed in Fig. 2-1, we certainly 
have fulfilled these initial two criteria. Second, we must determine if a phase 
transformation takes place, and if so, what type of phase transformation. Clearly, as the 
field variable, R, is increased, we see a transformation from the ordered phase (S;:::;I) to 
the disordered phase (S::::O) in the intermediate regime (see Fig. 2-1). 
To answer the question of what type of phase transformation occurs requires a bit 
more subtlety. Fig. 2-1 was created using the results of 180 simulations. Using our 
discrete model with p=OA, we performed 10 simulations each at R=1 ,2, ... ,18. The data 
points present in the ranges R=1 to R=7 and R=13 to R=18 represent the mean 
segregation often equilibrium ensembles. The 'error bars' in that range represent the 
standard deviation of segregation of these same ten ensembles. Ifwe were to plot the 
results in the range R=8 to R=12 in the same manner, we would see essentially the same 
sort of behavior seen in the p=0.35 portion of Fig 7. The mean segregation value would 
appear neither near one nor zero, and the run-to-run standard deviation of segregation 
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would be quite large. Upon recognizing that the distribution of results in this region was 
extremely bimodal, we chose to plot the results near S=l and those near S=O separately. 
By viewing the results of many simulations in which the same parameters are 
used, one can empirically construct a plot of the probability distribution of the order 
parameter, S. By repeating this process for several different values of the field variables 
(here, we use Rand R2 as field variables but we recognize that p and j), also can serve this 
purpose), we can discover how the probability distribution, P(S), evolves as change in the 
field variables passes the system through the transformation point. In first order phase 
transitions, this distribution is known to exhibit bimodality at the transition point. This 
indicates a coexistence of the two phases at the transition point, exemplified by the 
coexistence of ice and water during melting. In higher order phase transitions, such as 
certain ferromagnetic transitions, bimodality is not present at the transition; a unimodal 
distribution merely shifts from the ordered regime to the disordered regime. An 
expository graphical representation of these different modes of transition can be found as 
Fig. 2-3. 
0.2 D.'! 0.6 
0.2 D.'! 0.6 0.8 
0.2 O.'! 0.6 0.8 
Order Parameter, S Order Parameter, S 
Fig. 2-3 
Behavior of Order Parameter Distributions for First- and Higher-Order Transitions 
In a first-order phase transition, the two phases coexist at the transition point. Thus, the order 
parameter exhibits a bimodal distribution as the field variable(s) pass through that point. In higher­
order phase transitions, unimodality of this distribution is maintained throughout the transition. 
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IV. Results 
All aspects of the behavior of our discrete model (an extension of Schelling's 
work) are replicated in our continuous model (a generalization of Wassennan and Yohe' s 
work), including all three regimes of behavior, the persistent meta-stability, and 
occurrences of "superheating" and "supercooling". Thus, the shape of the utility 
contribution as a function of distance does not appear to have a fundamental impact upon 
simulation results. 
A plot of segregation versus R2 for our continuous model can be found as 
Fig. 2-4. By comparison with Fig. 7, it becomes clear that all three regimes of behavior 
are retained in our continuous model. 
.....e-(mu=O.1) Segregation 
-+- (mu=O.2) Segregation 
- ('I '): _ r " 
--.--(mu=O.4) Segregation




















Segregation vs. Rz for Several Different Preferences 
The continuous model exhibits the same qualitative behavior as the discrete 
model. All three regimes ofbehavior are retained. 
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Upon inspection of Fig. 2-4 it becomes clear that the behavior suggestive of a 
first-order phase transition is also present in our continuous model. In the range of 
parameter space (u=0.6, 2SR2~2.8), for example, we see run-to-run fluctuations 
indicative of the same sort of extreme bimodal distribution of segregation found in 
Fig. 2-1. This bimodal distribution resultant from our discrete model can be seen more 
explicitly as Fig. 2-5. Similarly, for our continuous model, the bimodal distribution 
suggested by Fig. 2-4 can be seen explicitly in Fig. 2-6. 
In some regions of the parameter space, we observe a behavior more complex 
than that suggestive of a first-order phase transition. While the results presented in 
Fig. 2-6 (the ,u=0.6, 2SR2~2.8 region of parameter space) appear to be purely in the 
intermediate regime, results 'near the border' of the unstable and intermediate regimes 
can exhibit a different behavior. In the range (u=0.5, 0.6SR2~2.0), we see a distribution 
of results that broadens greatly as it passes through the transition point (see Fig. 2-7) yet 
does not appear to exhibit the bimodal distribution we discovered earlier. 
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Fig. 2-6 
Distributions of the 
Order Parameter, S, as a 
Function of the Field 
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Distributions of the 
Order Parameter, S, as a 
Function of the Field 
Variable, R2, in our 
continuous model 
In a portion of the 
parameter space where 
Jl=0.5, we notice a 
behavior more complex 
than the bimodality 
observed in the 
intermediate regime. 
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v. Conclusion 
The results in the intennediate regime of both of our models have similarities to 
first order phase transitions in physical systems and suggest lines of exploration that 
could be of significant interest to the physics community. The additional discovery of the 
new transition behavior witnessed in Fig. 2-7 hints that further investigation may be quite 
fruitful. We continue to study this phenomenon and its relationship to past similar 
findings to detennine whether we are observing the appearance of previously discovered 
phenomena in a new setting or if we have, in fact, found compelling evidence for a new 
class of phase transitions. 
The continuous model also demonstrates the robustness of all sociologically 
relevant conclusions drawn in chapter one. The discovery of the presence of the same 
three behavioral regimes and all associated trends in both our models confinns that our 
original results were robust and not merely algorithmic artifacts related to the specific 
treatment of vision used in our discrete model. 
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